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The nuclear fuel cycle of the future will present us with new safeguards challenges. In 
this paper we will discuss several new technologies developed at LLNL that could be 
applied to safeguards. These are: fast neutron counting with list mode data acquisition, 
superconducting high resolution gamma spectrometer, compact solid state thermal 
neutron detectors, and a spectroscopic 3D gamma-ray imager with laser range scanner. 
 
 We will discuss a new segmented liquid scintillator multiplicity counter with nanosecond 
timing, which has 10-5 discrimination of neutrons and gamma-rays above 500 keV. Used 
passively, this fast neutron counter can detect isolated fission chain bursts in the presence 
of high backgrounds, such as in storage areas or where the signal is dominated by 
(alpha,n) or spontaneous fission backgrounds. It will be useful in quantifying total fissile 
mass. Used actively, in conjunction with 60-keV neutron interrogation to induce fission, 
it detects the high-energy fission neutrons and is blind to the interrogating beam. The 
60keV beam energy selectively fissions 235U and 239Pu and not 238U or 232Th. This 
technology will be useful for higher count rate applications than traditional multiplicity 
counters.   
 
We will also discuss a superconducting high resolution gamma spectrometer or 
microcalorimeter for ultra-precise analysis of low-energy gamma rays and X-rays. 
Superconducting gamma-ray spectrometers offer an order of magnitude higher energy 
resolution than conventional high-purity germanium detectors. This increases the 
precision of isotope ratio measurements in complicated mixtures that are affected by line 
overlap. We have developed gamma-ray detectors based on superconducting Mo/Cu 
multilayer sensors and attached bulk Sn absorbers. They have, depending on design, 
achieved an energy resolution between 50 and 100 eV FWHM at 100 keV, with count 
rate capabilities between up to 100 counts/s per pixel. We have also developed 
refrigeration technology for user-friendly detector operation at 0.1K. The detector can 
greatly improve the precision of destructive analysis (DA) as well as nondestructive 
analysis.  
 
LLNL is currently develop configurable, real-time, low-power, compact, solid state 
neutron detection system for special nuclear materials neutron signature detection with 
10% thermal neutron detection efficiency. This neutron detection system can be used for 
long term monitoring of nuclear material in storage, or it could be an added feature in a 
tag or seal. These neutron detection systems can also be used for detecting or monitoring 
neutron emissions in areas (e.g., under water, pipes, etc.) where there are complex 
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scattering environments, no available power, and little or no human access. There are two 
configurations in the neutron detector, namely, 10B for thermal neutron and 6,7LiF for 
higher energy neutrons, the 7Li is for normalization. 
 
Finally, we will discuss a spectroscopic 3D gamma-ray imager that, combined with a 
laser range scanner could be used for design information verification system and nuclear 
material accountability applications. The Compact Compton Imager (CCI) currently 
being developed by LLNL has the potential to greatly improve Materials Accountability 
through enabling an automatic, efficient and more accurate real-time holdup and material 
accumulation measurements in bulk facilities across the nuclear fuel cycle (enrichment, 
fuel fabrication, and reprocessing) for international safeguards.  With this instrument, we 
have recently demonstrated unprecedented imaging resolution, sensitivity and field of 
view, as well as 3D imaging capability. These features combined with an excellent 
spectroscopic resolution, create an instrument with unique capability for automatically 
mapping nuclear materials. This system can also enhance the current technology for 
Design Information Verification. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The nuclear fuel cycle of the future presents many technological challenges both in the 
near term, to determine the expected characteristics of the spent fuel and process 
monitoring, and in the long term, safeguards. A specific challenge is how much 
fissionable material is present in a particular sample, production line or storage area.  At 
different stages in the processing, how much SNM (235U and 239Pu/241Pu) is left in the 
spent fuel from the mixed oxide fuels such as in GNEP? Is the expected amount of SNM 
in the production line, storage area, or waste lines? How can we prove that none of the 
SNM has been diverted? In this paper we will discuss two new technologies developed at 
LLNL that could be applied to safeguards as well as GNEP. These are: 1) fast neutron 
counting with automated analysis, and 2) superconducting high resolution gamma 
spectrometer, 3) compact solid-state thermal neutron detectors and 4) spectroscopic 3D 
gamma-ray imager. New analysis methods will be briefly discussed. 
 
 
COUNTING OF FAST NEUTRONS 
 
Multiplicity counters are the workhorse of safeguards today. With the advent of mixed 
oxide fuels, the ability to measure plutonium in a direct measurement, rather than inferred 
from Cm/Pu ratios will be important. LLNL has developed a segmented liquid scintillator 
multiplicity counter with nanosecond timing, which has 105 discrimination of neutrons 
and gamma-rays above 500 keV. This detector is modular and scalable in size depending 
on overall efficiency requirements. It is based on NE-213 xylene-based liquid scintillator 
modules, now available as BC-501A from Bicron and EJ-301 from Eljen. Future 
detectors will be made from the EJ-309 to eliminate the flammability hazard of EJ-301. A 
photo of a 4” x 3” EJ-301 xylene liquid scintillator detector and PMT housing is shown in 
Error! Reference source not found.1. This type of liquid scintillator can also be used 
for neutron spectroscopy by unfolding the energy spectrum using a set of response 
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functions. Historically liquid scintillator detectors have had relatively poor gamma ray – 
neutron discrimination from analogue pulse-shape discrimination (PSD). With fast digital 
electronics, far superior neutron – gamma ray identification and much lower energy 
thresholds yield much better overall neutron efficiency and identification than is possible 
with analogue PSD’s. The fast digital electronic DAQ system can handle list mode data 
readout ~10KHz/Ch.  (see Figure 2.) 
 
 
Figure 1 Photograph of a 4” diameter x 3” Eljen EJ-301 xylene based liquid scintillator detector with 
integration PMT. 
 
 
Figure 2 Separation between neutrons and gamma-rays in the DAQ system. 
 
 
Used passively, this fast neutron counter can detect isolated fission chain bursts in the 
presence of high backgrounds. High background may occur in storage areas, or when the 
signal is dominated by (alpha,n) or additional spontaneous fission sources. With 3He 
detectors, neutrons created in isolated bursts are spread in time by neutron diffusion times 
required to thermalize the neutrons. Consequently neutrons from different spontaneous 
fission events overlap in time, making it difficult to separate the contributions of multiple 
kinds of neutron sources. This is especially true when the different sources are 
qualitatively statistically similar, as they are for different spontaneous fission sources. 
With this liquid scintillator detector array we have recently demonstrated the isolation of 
individual fission chains in low-multiplying Pu. The liquid scintillator array can be useful 
in quantifying total fissile mass by isolating spontaneous fission bursts; statistically the 
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different distributions of emitted neutrons (and gamma-rays) from Cm versus Pu 
spontaneous fission could be distinguished, and the absolute masses determined (from the 
rates of the separate kinds of spontaneous fission sources).  
 
Used actively in conjunction with 60 keV neutron interrogation, the liquid scintillators 
are threshold neutron detectors, blind to the interrogating beam, but responding to the 
induced high-energy fission neutrons. The 60 keV beam energy selectively fissions 235U 
and 239Pu and not 238U or 232Th. With fast timing to isolate induced fission events, this 
technology could be useful for high count rate applications.  
 
ANALYSIS METHODS. We have developed at LLNL a complete analytic point model 
theory of neutron counting distributions and time interval distributions. The foundation of 
the theory is a complete analytic solution1 of the Bohnel2 fission chain model. The 
fission chain theory completes the Dierckx and Hage3 and Hage and Cifarelli4 theory of 
random time gate and triggered time gate counting distributions. We have also developed 
a theory of time interval distributions, including skipped intervals5.  Using this theory we 
perform a multi-parameter maximum-likelihood analysis to determine the parameters 
values that characterize the distributions6,7. The parameters are: the system 
multiplication, a diffusion time constant (determined from the time-gate dependent 
Feynman variance to mean – see Figure 3), detection efficiency, spontaneous and (alpha, 
n) source strengths, external direct shine Poisson-distributed background count rate (that 
can also induce fission, as in active interrogation with an (alpha, n) source). A provisional 
model of cosmic ray background is also included. The theory has also been extended to 
include the neutron capture gamma-ray signal. 
 
A random source used in active interrogation of HEU, and that dominates the count rate 
due to direct shine on the 3He counters, is robustly separated in this analysis. This is 
because the Poisson contribution is qualitatively different from the fission signal, and its 
contribution is characterized by only a single parameter, the external count rate. This 
separation of sources capability can possibly be extended to the problem of separating the 
Pu contribution from a dominant Cm source, especially if this analysis is applied to the 
fast timing signal.  
 
 
Figure 3 252Cf spontaneous fission count distribution (blue) compared to a Poisson distribution of 
the same count rate (red) for a 512 sec time gate. The right panel shows the time dependent 
Feynman variance to mean. The last point is determined by the increased variance of the count 
distribution in the left panel. 
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The liquid scintillator detectors also bring energy discrimination of the neutron flux 
which will inherently contain some information of the source (spontaneous fission vs. 
alpha induced neutrons) but also leads to our third area of investigation which is low 
energy neutron interrogation of a sample.   SNM like 235U or 239Pu compared to Curium 
isotopes has a very different and specific ratio of spontaneous neutron emission versus 
thermal neutron induced fission neutrons. By actively interrogating the material with a 
low dose of thermal or thermalized 60 keV neutrons, one can well differentiate if the 
spontaneous neutron emission comes from curium or plutonium, for example.  For an 
identical neutron emission rate, plutonium will react strongly to an external low energy 
neutron flux by emitting MeV neutrons, but curium does not.       
 
SUPERCONDUCTING HIGH RESOLUTION GAMMA SPECTROMETER 
 
Gamma spectrometry is widely used to determine the isotopic analysis of radioactive 
materials in Safeguards. Cryogenic gamma-ray spectrometers operating at temperatures 
of T~ 0.1K offer an order of magnitude improvement in energy resolution over 
conventional high purity germanium detectors.8 They typically consist of an absorber 
attached to a sensitive thermometer, both weakly thermally linked to a cold bath. We are 
developing gamma-ray detectors based on bulk superconducting Sn absorbers coupled to 
Mo/Cu superconducting-to-normal transition edge sensors (TESs)9,10,11 
 
Figure 4 Schematic of superconducting transition edge sensor (not to scale)- 
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We are also developing refrigeration and readout technology for user-friendly detector 
operation at ~0.1 K. These detectors have achieved an energy resolution between ~50 and 
90 eV FWHM for energies below 100 keV and are ideally suited for precise 
nondestructive analysis of nuclear samples. The spectrum of a low-enriched uranium 
sample (Figure 5) illustrates the advantage superconducting detectors offer for the 
analysis of nuclear samples. The 90 keV region of the spectrum is of interest for the 
analysis of uranium-containing samples, as it can be used for precise measurements of 
enrichment based on emission lines with very similar energies. (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 5 Cryogenic spectrometer with detector cold finger (left). Gamma spectrum of a low-enriched 
uranium sample in the 90 keV region used for precision measurements of uranium enrichment. A 
spectrum of the same sample from a planar Ge detector is included for comparison. 
  
This increase in energy resolution in the low-energy region can be very helpful for 
safeguards measurements where enhanced precision is needed. This is not only the case 
for measuring uranium enrichment at 92 keV, but also, for example, in precision 
measurements of plutonium isotopes at 100 keV. The method will help to detect weak 
lines above background and thus measuring minor isotopes such as 242Pu directly, rather 
than inferring them through model-based correlations with other isotopes.12 While mass 
spectrometry ultimately provides higher sensitivity, the automation and ease of operation 
makes gamma spectroscopy the preferred tool for initial inspection of a large number of 
samples.  
 
 
SOLID STATE NEUTRON DETECTORS 
 
LLNL is currently developing configurable, real-time, low-power, compact, solid state 
neutron detection system for special nuclear materials neutron signature detection with 
10% thermal neutron detection efficiency. This neutron detection system can be used for 
long term monitoring of nuclear material in storage, or it can be an added feature in a tag 
or seal. These neutron detection systems can be also used for detecting or monitoring 
neutron emissions in areas (e.g., underwater, in pipes, etc.) where there are complex 
scattering environments, no available power, and little or no human access. There are two 
  IAEA-CN-1073/ 
TOPIC: New and Novel Safeguards Technologies  
configurations in the neutron detector, namely 10B for thermal neutrons and 6,7LiF for 
higher energy neutrons. 
 
LLNL originally developed novel inexpensive neutron detectors for the long-term 
monitoring of neutron activity from contraband nuclear material in areas that are 
inaccessible, such as a cargo-ship container during transport13 Our design uses 5mm-
diameter, self-biased 10B-coated neutron detectors (tiny neutron tags) that have 2% 
efficiency for thermal neutron detection. These detectors have been demonstrated in the 
laboratory that they can detect neutrons emitted from plutonium in a complex scattering 
environment in a reasonable amount of time.  These coin-sized detectors (when mass-
produced) could be ~$20 a piece. For Safeguards, a simple detector that can be placed on 
pipes and casks to determine bulk measurement of neutrons (or lack thereof) for tracking 
processes and ensuring there is no diversion. 
 
We have developed a prototype of a tiny tag with 15mW electronics (See Figure 4). Time 
information of each event is stored for further data analysis. These semi-conductor 
detectors are better than currently available  6Li doped scintillation fibers and 
photomultiplier based scintillation detectors. They are also immune to gamma-rays and 
stable in comparison to 3He tubes.  
 
 
Figure 6. Solid state based neutron detection system with 15mW electronics. 
 
More recently, we are developing next generation solid-state neutron detectors with 
thermal neutron detection efficiency beyond 25%. These high aspect ratio pillars14 will 
be filled with CVD 10B, 6,7LiF for both thermal and low energy neutron detection. (Figure 
5) 
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Figure 7. High aspect ratio silicon pillar structure developed at LLNL. When filled with 10B and 
6,7LiF, the neutron detection efficiency for this system can be as high as 50%. 
 
These inexpensive tiny tags can be used for ubiquitous neutron monitoring in the GNEP 
processes as “smart tags” for tracking material flow. In a centrifuge facility, they may be 
used as neutron imagers within the centrifuge hall to monitor for possible diversions 
(Neutron imagers have been suggested by Mark Pickrell.)15  The information can be 
propagated with wireless options.  
 
SPECTROSCOPIC 3D GAMMA-RAY IMAGER 
 
LLNL is currently developing a new imaging technique able to provide 3D images of 
gamma-ray sources. Unlike standard 3D tomographic methods, this stand-off imaging 
technique does not require the field of view to be bounded within a predefined physical 
space.  
 
 
 
Figure 8 A 3D Design Information Verification (DIV) laser range scanner (left) and a Compact 
Compton Imager (CCI) gamma-ray camera on a mobile cart (right). This work is a collaboration 
with ORNL and Euratom. 
 
In the present implementation, the gamma-ray imaging system is based on planar Si(Li) 
and HPGe double sided segmented detectors, which are used in a Compton camera 
configuration. This imaging system follows up on a previous imager made of a single Ge 
detector16. With this imaging system, unlike other gamma-ray imagers, the directionality 
of the photons is not obtained by using collimators, but by measuring the scattering angle 
and scattering direction of the incident photon in a Compton interaction inside a position 
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sensitive detector. An added benefit of using these detectors is their outstanding 
spectroscopic capabilities (2keV at 662keV), which allows the system to create 
independent 3D images for each radioisotope of interest17.  
 
A lidar system is used in conjunction with the gamma-ray imaging system to confine the 
gamma-ray image space to the interior of physical objects situated within the vicinity of 
the gamma-ray imager. This approach results in superior image contrast and much 
reduced image reconstruction processing times. Figure 10 shows an example of such a 
3D gamma-ray image of a 152Eu source. In Figure 9, a snapshot of the virtual model of 
the laboratory room as obtained from the lidar scans is shown along with a backprojected 
gamma-ray distribution as obtained from a single gamma-ray projection. The whole 3D 
gamma-ray image showed in figure 10 required gamma-ray projections taken from 3 
different positions. 
Figure 9 Snapshot of the 3D integrated model of the room. Backprojected hot spots of 
radioactivity are represented as surface plots superposed onto the virtual scan. The position of 
the gamma-ray imager is represented by the inner coordinate system on the right side. 
 
 
The new imaging technique can potentially increase the sensitivity and automation level 
for inspection, search, monitoring and diagnostics of special nuclear materials in 
reprocessing facilities and glove boxes.  
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Figure 10: Example of a 3D gamma-ray image (a linear 1m long Eu-152 gamma-ray source was used. 
The voxalized image space was determined by the lidar scans. 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
We have discussed two technologies developed at LLNL for Homeland Security 
applications. We have given some reasons why these techniques can be brought to bear 
on the Safeguards problem.  
 
This work  performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under Contract DE-AC52-07NA27344.
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